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Abstract 
Game theory is a relevant and powerful tool for analyzing strategic interactions in a supply chain in 
which the decision of each player affect the payoff of other players. In order to relax the classical two 
supply chain members’ situation to a three supply chain members’ situation and to integrate the 
problem of competition at retail level, we consider a supply chain consisting of a monopolistic 
manufacturer and two duopolistic retailers. The latter two are geographically related.  
Our paper examines the optimal decisions on advertising (local, national and cooperative advertising) 
in a centralized and a decentralized supply chain using Stackelberg – Cournot game, Stackelberg - 
Collusion game and Cooperative games, and we investigate the impact of the existing of competition 
at retail level, the retailer coalition and the cooperation between all supply chain members’ on the 
channel members’ optimal decisions, on the sales volume and on the profits. 
Applying the equilibrium analysis and using numerical example, comparing results indicates that all 
advertising, the sales volume of each member and the total profit in the centralized decision-making 
are larger than those in the decentralized decision-making. Retailer coalition harms themselves (in 
terms of profit) despite the increasing of sales, but is beneficial to the manufacturer. We identify also 
the feasible solutions of the best cooperative advertising scheme that members are interesting in 
cooperation. 
Keywords: Game theory; Cooperative advertising; Supply chain coordination; Retail competition, 
retail coalition.  
JEL Classification: C7, M3. 
1. Introduction 
Over the past two decades, many researchers and practitioners have shown great interest in 
the application of game theory in marketing and supply chain management. Especially, game 
theoretic models have proven of considerable interest and useful in the supply chain 
coordination. The latter has become an effectively mechanism improving the performance of 
organizations in various industries. The uncoordinated system leads to the classic 
phenomenon of “double marginalization” identified by Spengler (1950) in which the retailer 
does not consider the supplier’s profit margin when making arbitrary his decisions and to the 
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concept of “bullwhip effect” which occurs when the amplification of demand variability 
increases as one moves up supply chain and makes decision ignoring the others. 
We can distinguish between decentralized and centralized supply chain system. In supply 
chain with centralized decision making, both manufacturer and retailers are trying to integrate 
the channel and to determine the optimal solution that improves the total performance of 
supply chain. In a supply chain with decentralized decision making, each supply chain 
member acts independently in order to improve its profit share (individual performance).  
 
For effective modeling the supply chain system and analyzing the decision making, game 
theory provides mathematical background and generates solutions in competitive or 
conflicting situations (conflicting and antagonistic). Traditionally, game theory, also called 
strategic situations, is divided into two main approaches according to the interdependence 
between the actors (members of supply chain) who make interactive procedures to benefit 
themselves or the entire supply chain. These approaches may be cooperative or non-
cooperative. In the non cooperative approach, the actors are individual players. This game 
approach specifies various actions available to the players and tries to predict the strategies 
chosen by the other player. By contrast, in the cooperative approach, the actors are able to 
communicate and cooperate (the coalition players). This game approach describes the set of 
possible outcomes, studies the payoffs that the players can attain after the coalition, predicts 
the coalitions that will form and divides the outcomes.  
Many important studies in the recent years have been addressed different aspects of supply 
chain coordination and business decisions, including pricing, advertising, production, 
purchasing and inventory management, etc. Most of these studies have focused on a bilateral 
monopoly model by considering a single manufacturer sells its product through an exclusive 
and independent retailer and they have identified the coordination efforts by implementing a 
cooperative (co-op) advertising program which is, practically, an arrangement and interactive 
relationship between the members of distribution whereby the manufacturer pays a portion of 
the retailer’s local advertising expenditures; the fraction shared by the manufacturer is 
generally referred to as the manufacturer’s participate rate. The main aim for a manufacturer 
to use the cooperative advertising is to strengthen the image of the national brand name 
investment and to motivate immediate sales incentives by local advertisement at the retail 
level. However, the existing literature based on a bilateral duopoly by considering a 
competition in retailing level is very scanty. 
The research literature related to our paper on supply chain coordination management using 
the static game theoretic model for cooperative advertising can be divided into two groups 
according to the numbers of the supply chain members. It is shown that some previous studies 
have therefore focused on the Stackelberg structure, some others on Nash structure and some 
others on both structures. The Stackelberg game can be summarized by a manufacturer acts 
first as a Stackelberg leader and a retailer move sequentially as Stackelberg follower. In the 
Nash game, the players move simultaneous.  
The first group concentrates on supply chain consisting of one manufacturer and one retailer. 
In this context, the model proposed by Xie and Wei (2009) assumed that demand function is 
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influenced by both pricing and advertising expenditures. The authors founded closed-form 
unique optimal solutions in both the Stackelberg model and the cooperative model in a single 
period. Comparing the results of these two models, Xie and Wei explained the importance of 
adopting two coordination instruments (wholesale price and coop participation rate) and 
demonstrated that the highest total profit is gained when both players cooperate. This 
cooperation has led to a decreasing of retail price to consumer and to an increasing of 
advertising expenditures. 
The first paper, which considered not only a leadership of the manufacturer, but also a 
dominant retailer, was written by Xie and Neyret (2009). They used a static model to propose 
a model including the cooperative advertising and pricing decisions simultaneously. They 
developed four different models which are based on three non cooperative games (i.e., Nash, 
Stackelberg manufacturer and Stackelberg retailer) and one cooperative game. A comparison 
between the variables, especially the profits, of all cases leads to consider the cooperation 
case in which profits are the highest for both retailer and the manufacturer.  
SeyedEsfahani et al (2011) consider vertical co-op advertising along with pricing decisions in 
manufacturer-retailer supply chain. This work applied these four games on the model 
proposed by Xie and Wei (2009), but relaxed the assumption of a linear price demand 
function. The authors illustrated that both the manufacturer and the retailer reach the highest 
profit level and the retail price is the lowest when the members’ supply chain decide to 
cooperate, but the advertising expenditures are higher in non-cooperative games. 
Aust and Busher (2012) extended the existing research by considering four classical types of 
relationships between a manufacturer and a retailer using the game theory models .They 
modified the price and the advertising demand functions of SeyedEsfahani et al (2011) by 
introduction the retailer margin according to Choi (1991, 1996) in order to relax the restrictive 
assumption of identical margins. The authors have not limited the ratio between 
manufacturer’s and retailer’s margin and they obtained the same results in Xie and Wei 
(2009). 
The second group includes the existing research of game theoretical models for coordinating 
cooperative advertising (with the presence of competition at retailing level in supply chain) in 
channel exhibiting competition at retail level.  
Karray and Zaccour (2006) considered a model of retail’s promotional efforts for distribution 
channel formed by two manufacturers and two retailers and investigated the effectiveness of 
cooperative advertising programs. The author demonstrated that cooperative advertising can 
also have harmful impacts on the retailers. 
Wang et al (2011) considered the cooperative advertising issues for a supply chain consisting 
of one monopolistic manufacturer and two duopolistic retailers. Through a comparison among 
the four game structures (Stackelberg - Cournot,  Stackelberg – Collusion, Nash - Cournot,  
Nash – Collusion), the authors revealed the impact of duopolistic retailers’ competitive 
behaviors on the local advertising expenditures, brand name investment, local advertising 
allowance level and the profits of all participants. In addition, the authors developed the 
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centralized decision model and presented a local advertising cost sharing contract based on 
the utility of risk preference. They determined whether the partners have any motivations to 
transit to a different behavior cited above and concluded that the joint decision can improve 
the performance of the entire supply chain. 
Another study contributes to extend the studies of cooperative advertising issues of a single 
manufacturer-single retailer and to provide new insights is the study of Zhang and Xie (2012). 
Choosing to use a static game, this study developed a multiple-retailer model and examined 
the impacts of this retailer’s multiplicity on channel members’ optimal decisions and on total 
channel efficiencies by measuring explicitly the gain/losses of channel efficiencies under 
different game considered. The quantitative findings differed according to the type of retailer. 
With a multiple symmetric retailers in the distribution channel, the channel efficiency 
increases with the local advertising effectiveness and the manufacturer’s (national advertising 
investment) relative channel power, however, it deteriorates quickly as the number of retailer 
scales up. With a multiple asymmetric retailers, the distribution channel suffers from the 
manufacture’s uniform participation strategy and benefits with the manufacturer’s retailer-
specific participation strategy. 
Ben Youssef and Dridi (2013) suggest a marketing channel with one manufacturer and two 
symmetric retailers where the demand function is dependent on pricing and national 
advertising. Three game theoretic models are established including the non cooperative game, 
the partial cooperative game and the full cooperation game. The authors propose a new and 
unusual evaluation of consumers’ surplus which positively depends not only on the price-
demand function but also on the spending in national advertising.  
The paper of Alirezai and KhoshAlhan (2014) considered pricing and cooperative advertising 
decisions in two-stage supply chain. They developed a monopolistic retailer and duopolistic 
retailer’s model by using Nash, Manufacturer – Stackelberg and cooperative game. The 
authors modified the demand function of Xie and Wei (2009) by introducing the retailer 
margin as a new decision variable according to Choi (1991) (like the paper of Aust and 
Busher (2012) with    ). In the case of the duopolistic retailers’ model, Alirezai and 
KhoshAlhan suggest that one party’s advertising effort will reduce the other’s share of the 
marketing demand (see Luo (2006)). The authors found that the supply chain members’ can 
gain more profits in the cooperative than in non cooperative structure in both models.  
Jorgensen S. and Zaccour G. (2013) and Aust G. and Busher U. (2014) surveyed the literature 
on cooperative advertising in marketing channels using game theoretic models. The paper of 
Jorgensen S. and Zaccour G. (2013) divided the literature into main approaches: the first 
treats simple marketing channels (one manufacturer – one retailer channel). The second 
adopts complex marketing channel (multiple manufacturer – multiple retailer channels). Each 
approach presented two models: static model and dynamic model.  
Nevertheless, researches which explicitly evaluate the competition effect between upstream or 
downstream members (a supply chain formed by a multiple manufacturers or multiple 
retailers) are very complex, scarce and sparse. For this reason, we intend to extend, firstly, the 
existing research illustrated above that has not integrated the problem of downstream 
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competition because the assumption of more one retailer is more pragmatic. In other words, 
we aim to relax the classical two supply chain members’ situation to a three supply chain 
members’ situation. Secondly, we want to enrich, according to our knowledge, the few 
research studies that considered the channel with duopolistic competitive retailers and we 
aspire to get new/better insights into the effects of the existing of competition at retail level 
and the cooperation on the channel members’ optimal decisions and on the profits. 
The remainder of our paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the necessary notations 
and assumptions of our study and develops the decentralized and centralized decision models.  
Section 3 compares the three game structures of decision model via simple and general cases. 
Section 4 summarizes our main findings and proposes possible directions for future research  
2. The basic model and assumptions 
In this paper, we consider a distribution channel consisting of one manufacturer and two 
retailers in which the monopolistic manufacturer produces its product and sells it to final 
consumer who is the last point in the distribution channel through a retailer in competition 
with another independent retailer.  
We assume that the manufacturer invests in the product’s national brand name advertising in 
order to influence potential consumers to consider a particular brand and 
develops brand knowledge and preference (creating effective brand awareness). The retailers 
invest in the local advertising effort to boost the consumer demand and to enhance the sales.  
Regardless of the local or national levels, we know full well that the advertising efforts 
influence separately the generating sales and depend strongly on the consumer perception. 
Also, they generally have positive effects on the ultimate product sales. 
Our demand function, extended to the model of Kim and Staelin (1999), Karray and Zaccour 
(2006) and Xie and Wei (2009), is assumed to be a function based on square roots of the two 
retailers’ local advertising expenditures and the manufacturer’s national advertising 
expenditure. So, we do not take pricing decisions into account in order to simplify our 
expressions. We assume that the different retailers are geographically related: the local 
advertising effort benefits both the investing retailer and the other competing retailer located 
in close physical proximity. 
We postulate the expected sales volume function     of retailer   to be determined by: 
                                           
 
where the parameters           are positive constants; they may be interpreted as follows: 
   : denotes the demand base with respect to zero advertising input. 
  : denotes the measure of sensitivity of retailer ’s sales with respect to changes of retailer ’s 
local advertising expenditures. 
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   : the local advertising expenditures invested by retailer  . 
  : denotes the measure of sensitivity of retailer 2’s sales with respect to changes of retailer 
1’s local advertising expenditures. 
  : the national brand name investment of the manufacturer. 
  : denotes the influence degree of manufacturer’s brand name investment on each retailer’s 
demand. 
We assume that          , the demand function of the manufacturer. 
We note that the demand function is an increasing and concave function with respect to    
and   as agreed in marketing literature.  
Further, the manufacturer looks for motivated immediate sales at the retail level. For this 
reason, he adopts the cooperative advertising programs by sharing a proportion of the local 
advertising expenditures in order to increase the retailers’ advertising budgets without 
spending more of retailers’ own funds. In other words, for every unit spent by the retailers for 
product advertising, we suppose that the manufacturer will compensate them a percentage 
amount  , where      . This means that if each retailer spends a unit in advertising, he 
will get t unit back from the manufacturer as a motivation for his advertising efforts.  
The profit functions for each retailer  , the manufacturer, the two retailers and the supply 
chain system are as follows, respectively: 
                               
 
    
                          
 
    
                             
 
    
                           
 
    
where    is the sales volume function of retailer i,. And we have the following notations: 
   : the retailer  ’s marginal profit per unit. 
   : the manufacturer’s marginal profit per unit. 
  : the participation rate that is the fraction of local advertising expenditures shared by the 
manufacturer with each retailer.  
   : the profit of retailer  . 
   : the profit of the manufacturer. 
   :  the profit of the two retailers. 
   : the profit for the whole supply chain.  
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Before concluding this section, we specify the necessary assumption used in our paper. 
 Assumption 1: the selling prices of the retailers are exogenous. 
 
 Assumption 2: we assume         to imply that the demand base level is the    
same.        
 
 Assumption 3: the manufacturer sets the same proportion of the advertising allowance 
to two competing retailers because we prefer to treat the duopolistic retailers equally 
due to the existence of competition at this level.     
 
 Assumption 4:  we assume that       and     to ensure the “existence of the 
equilibrium solution “.  The latter means that the demand of each retailer faces is more 
sensitive (is greater) to his own local advertising efforts than to his rival’s because the local 
advertising efforts by one retailer can reach consumers who prefer to buy from a competition 
retailer. Otherwise, no one would be interested in spending money on the local advertising 
(see Wang et al., (2011)).    
To simplify notation, we use         and     to denote, respectively, scenario  : St-Cournot, 
scenario  : St-collusion and scenario  : Cooperation. 
 
2.1 The decentralized decision models 
In the setting of decentralized decision-making structure, the manufacturer and the two 
competitive retailers act individually to maximize their own profit without considering the 
profits of others. In the following, we will analyze the interactive relationship between the 
manufacturer and the duopolistic retailers as game theoretic model in order to examine how 
the supply chain members make independently their (advertising policies) decisions when the 
manufacturer moves first as the Stackelberg leader (manufacturer - Stackelberg process), and 
then the two retailers react as followers by adopting three different competitive behaviors 
cited below: 
(i) In this setting, each retailer moves independently at the same time in the downstream 
supply chain market by pursuing Cournot behavior and assuming his rival’s as a 
parameter. This game is known as the simultaneous move game. 
 
(ii) In this setting, the retailers work collaboratively against the manufacturer, that’s why 
they obey Collusion behavior in the downstream market of supply chain. This game 
is known as the cooperative game. 
 
(iii) In this setting, the retailers pursue the Stackelberg behavior. One retailer acts as a 
leader, while the other acts as a follower. This game is known as the Stackelberg 
game. 
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In our study, we only focus on the two first settings because the latest setting has the same 
results with those obtained in first setting.   
2.1.1 Stackelberg - Cournot game 
In this subsection, we model a channel members’ decision process as a two-stage non 
cooperative game, with the manufacturer as the leader and the duopolistic retailers as the 
followers (the manufacturer has the greater power than the retailers). In the first stage, the 
manufacturer decides its national advertising expenditure   and its co-op participation rate . 
In the second stage, the two competitive retailers decide, simultaneously and independently, 
their local advertising expenditures           
This game is solved by backward induction method and its solution is called Stackelberg 
equilibrium. To find the equilibrium of a Stackelberg game, we begin at the end of this game 
(the second stage) and we first need to solve the retailers’ optimal problems when the brand 
name investment   and the shared fraction of local advertising expenditure   declared by the 
manufacturer are given.  
Following Cournot behavior, retailer   will maximize     with respect to   while treating   , 
  and   as a parameters, and retailer   will maximize     with respect to    while treating    
  and   as a parameters1: 
                                   
 
st     
          
 
  
  
 
 
 
 
    
                                   
 
st     
          
 
  
  
 
 
 
 
    
 Noting that     and     are, respectively, concave functions of    and    and have a unique 
optimal solution, we can solve the two first order equations 
    
   
   and 
    
   
   to get the 
optimal values cited below.  
Given the decisions variables of manufacturer and under the duopolistic retailers' Cournot 
behavior, the optimal local advertising for each retailer is: 
   
 
 
 
  
    
      
 
 
    
   
 
 
 
  
    
      
 
 
    
                                                             
1
 Second-order conditions are verified because : 
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In the first stage, the manufacturer knows the retailers’ reaction functions and maximizes his 
profit function
2
. Hence, the manufacturer’s optimal problem can be formulated by substituting 
    and     into     as: 
         
 
 
 
              
     
         
 
 
 
        
    
  
      
   
 
 
              
 
     
In order to solve this problem, we neglect the constraints and we equate the two first order 
partial derivatives to zero as below: 
   
  
 
    
  
     
 
     
   
  
 
 
 
 
                 
      
 
 
 
 
     
    
  
      
 
 
 
 
        
    
  
      
   
     
 
Proposition 1: the Stackelberg - Cournot game, where the manufacturer behave as leader and 
the two retailers are Cournot competitors and act as followers, has a unique equilibrium (  
 , 
  
 ,   ,   ) 
  
  
 
  
 
  
                        
    
    
   
    
   
 
 
     
  
  
 
  
 
  
                        
    
    
   
    
   
 
 
     
     
     
 
     
   
                     
    
  
                     
    
  
 
 
     
See Appendix for the expressions of the sales volume and the profit of each member and the 
total channel’s profit for all cases.  
 
2.1.2 Stackelberg - Collusion game 
                                                             
2 Second-order conditions are verified because: 
 
    
   
  
 
 
   
   
    
 
 
    
    
   
  
 
  
                     
    
    
     
    
   
   
    
    
    One can simply check the 
Hessian as: 
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In this section, we assume that the manufacturer in the upstream market and the two retailers, 
in the downstream market, recognize their interdependence and agree to work together in 
order to maximize their total profit
3
. So, the total profit of the downstream retail market is: 
                                                          
 
This optimization problem can easily be solved by differentiating the total profit of retail 
market with respect to    and    and equating to zero. The total profit of the duopolistic 
retailers    achieves its maximum, for any given national advertising and rate participation, 
at: 
   
 
 
 
         
 
      
 
 
     
   
 
 
 
         
 
      
 
 
     
As a leader, the manufacturer knows the optimal values of retailers’ local advertising 
expenditures defined in      and     , and she substitute it into the manufacturer’s profit 
function defined in    . The manufacturer’s optimization problem can be formulated as4: 
         
 
 
             
     
       
 
 
          
           
   
      
 
                 
 
 
                
 
(20) 
Then, by ignoring the constraints and solving the first partial derivatives of    with respect to 
  and  , we can obtain the unique equilibrium solution as follows: 
Proposition 2: the unique equilibrium solution for the Stackelberg - Collusion game is given 
by: 
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 Second-order conditions are verified because : 
    
   
   
 
 
 
       
  
 
 
          
    
   
   
 
 
 
       
  
 
 
       
4 Second-order conditions are verified because : 
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2.2 The centralized decision model 
In this section, we analyze the decisions of the centralized supply chain. We focus on a 
cooperative game structure in which the manufacturer and the duopolistic retailers cooperate 
as integrated channel and agree to make decisions together that maximize the total supply 
chain profit function which is the sum of the manufacturer’s profit and the retailers’ profit.  
Hence, the optimization problem under centralized model can be written as
5
 : 
                                                 
 
                          
 
                       
 
 
 
 
     
 
The joint profit maximization, described by the above equation, depends only on   ,   ,    
when the manufacturer and the two retailers agree to cooperate, the manufacturer neglect the 
arrangement whereby he pays a percentage of local advertising expenditures for both retailers. 
In order to solve this optimization and to find final results, we differentiate the total supply 
chain profit function with respect to each decision variables and we equate to zero. 
Proposition 3: under centralized channel     , the channel members’ equilibrium advertising 
levels that maximize the total channel profit are: 
                                                             
5
 Second-order are verified because : 
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3. Comparison of optimal solutions for the three games 
     3. 1 A special case with         
After having presented the equilibrium solutions of the centralized and decentralized games 
above, we can now compare them. It is convenient to first consider an important special case 
in which        . This case can be intuitively explained as the duopolistic retailers 
having the similar marginal profit. We can utilize the same analyses as in the previous two 
sections in order to identify the optimal solutions for the three game scenarios Stackelberg-
Cournot, Stackelberg collusion and cooperation in this special case. The results obtained are 
presented in the following table: 
Table   
Summary of the optimal solutions if        . 
 
 
 
Scenario 1: St-Cournot 
 
 
Scenario 2: St-collusion 
 
Scenario 3 : Cooperation 
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The expressions cited in table above depend on the three parameters used on our analysis, i.e. 
 ,   and  . These parameters can be interpreted as effectiveness of local and national 
advertising expenditures. Under the two first cases, one can easily observe that the 
manufacturer gives a fraction of local advertising expenditures to the two retailers. Also, we 
remark that if        , we have         and          That is to say, if the 
duopolistic retailers have the same marginal profit, they have the same local advertising 
expenditures and the same incomes.     
According to the theoretical analysis above, we find that the effectiveness of compete 
retailer’s local advertising     has an important effect on the optimal decisions of the 
members
6
, the profit of each member and the profit of whole supply chain. Here, we will give 
some numerical examples and then we will compare between the three cases using schemas. 
We assume that the values of parameters are:                   7. 
                                                             
6 We note that the national advertising   depends only on  . 
7
 The rest of the examples show similar results to those of the chosen, so we omit presenting their results 
(same for the general case).   
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From the schemes presented above, we can derive the following proposition: 
Proposition 4: 
(i)             
 
(ii)               
 
(iii)           
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(iv)    
                 
 
(v)   
              
Under Stackelberg-Collusion scenario, the two retailers would allocate more money on local 
advertising rather than under Stackelberg-Cournot scenario. However, the manufacturer keeps 
the same amount of investment in national advertising and the fraction of advertising 
expenditures that reimburse by him drops off. This result is unexpected and surprising 
because the only paper that addresses the problem of the cooperative advertising issues for 
two echelons supply chain consisting of one manufacturer and two competitive retailers 
demonstrated that, on one hand, the manufacturer would spend more money on national 
advertising investment.  
On other hand, the equilibrium fraction of local advertising expenditures that shared by 
manufacturer, when the tow retailers collude, would exceed the counterpart when the two 
retailers behave Cournot. This may be explained by the fact that if the manufacturer is the 
leader and the duopolistic retailers pursue Collusion behavior, the manufacturer refrains from 
increasing the value of his participation in local advertising cost. Further, the manufacturer 
prefers the lowest participation rate when the effectiveness of local advertising efforts is 
higher than the effectiveness of national advertising efforts.  
Under Cooperation between all the members of supply chain, both the monopolistic 
manufacturer and the duopolistic retailers will invest more on advertising: the highest national 
and local advertising expenditures occur in the cooperation. These high investments in 
advertising yield to increase sales. Consequently, the advertising is a type of an effective 
investment and has a positive association with the profit. 
Proposition 5: 
(i)    
          
                    
(ii)   
         
 
(iii)   
          
Normally, the profit of each retailer improves if they are followers and play Stackelberg-
Collusion. Or in our paper, we discover that the cooperation between retailers leads to a 
decrease in their profit. That is to say, the retailers choosing Stackelberg-collusion will not 
benefit themselves but they will benefit the manufacturer because the latter obtains the highest 
profit under Stackelberg-collusion, yet the lowest under Stakelberg-Cournot, which is out of 
our expectation. This implies that the manufacturer prefers the cooperation situation between 
retailers and not the conflict situation.   
The cooperative model generates the highest channel’s total profit than the Stakelberg-
Cournot model. So, we confirm the popular result founded in the previous literature that is the 
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highest profit will be attained in the cooperation scenario and the aim of making decision 
cooperatively is to maximize the total system’s profits. 
Proposition 6: 
(i)         
  
 
(ii)         
This proposition identifies the conditions under which the profit of each member is the 
highest in the cooperation situation than in the others situations. We will explain numerically 
this proposition in the proposition     and     .    
     3. 2 The general case with        
The purpose of the general case is to find an appropriate answer to the question of whether the 
results obtained in the special case with          still remain in general case with 
     . We can intuitively interpret this case as the two competitive retailers having 
different marginal profit. We will thus present numerical examples to investigate it because 
our analytical expressions are complex to provide meaningful insights. We illustrate the 
theoretical results and explore the differences between the centralized supply chain and the 
decentralized supply chain. For our numerical example, we assume the following values of 
the parameters considered:                            
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As shown in the figures above, the results - concerning the retailers’ local advertising, the 
national advertising, the participate rate, the sales volume function of each member - are 
similar with those obtained previously in the simple case.  
Now we assume that the members of supply chain are willing to engage in the cooperative 
program. The manufacturer and the two retailers set the national and the local advertising 
expenditures that maximize the total profit of cooperation. Then, for any arbitrarily given 
participation rate  , the profits of the manufacturer  and the two retailers would be 
respectively given by: 
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The monopolistic manufacturer and the duopolistic retailers agree to make joint decisions if 
their individual profit is higher in the cooperative game than in non-cooperative ones. So, we 
need to illustrate that: 
           
                
 
and 
             
           
       
 
By integrating equations      and     , we have: 
                     
       
 
Proposition 7: 
 
(i)         
                    
  
                                                       
 
   
    
             
(i)                                          
 
             
 
         
                     
As shown in proposition   , the lowest amount of profit for the manufacturer and for the 
whole supply chain is reached under the Stackelberg - Cournot game. The manufacturer 
prefers that the two duopolistic retailers play a Stackelberg – Collusion game rather than the 
Stackelberg – Cournot game. This result is different from this found by Ben Youssef and 
Dridi (2013) because they have shown that the manufacturer’s profit decrease under the 
Stackelberg – Collusion.   
The manufacturer agrees to cooperate if he offers a fraction of the retailers’ advertising 
expenditures lower than 
 
         
                    . The two retailers will engage in a 
cooperative program if the manufacturer offers them a participation rate higher than 
 
   
    
  
          . 
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From propositions     and, all supply chain members are interested in cooperation if the 
participation rate is between a minimal value and a maximal value (       
 
   
    
  
                  
 
         
                        . 
4. Concluding Remarks 
In this present paper, our main motivation is to extend the scarcity of existing researches 
considered a supply chain formed by one manufacturer - one retailer to supply chain formed 
by one manufacturer - two competitive retailers with demand function based on square roots 
of the retailers’ local and manufacture’s national advertising expenditures. Also, we consider 
a cooperative advertising program, where the manufacturer agrees to pay a percentage of the 
retailers’ advertising expenditures. 
To examine the impacts of the existing competition at retail level and the cooperation on 
channel members’ decisions (local advertising expenditures, national advertising 
expenditures, cooperative advertising program), we analyze three different relationships 
within the monopolistic manufacturer – duopolistic retailers supply chain using games theory 
(i.e., Stackelberg-Cournot game, Stackelberg-collusion game and cooperative game). And 
then, we identify the optimal advertising decisions.   
Through a comparison of the results obtained under three games and resorting to numerical 
example, this paper shows that: (a) the two competitive retailers agree to engage in the 
cooperative program if the manufacturer gives them a sufficient participation rate (       
 
   
    
            ). Otherwise, they prefer working independently. The manufacture, in 
turn, agrees to cooperate if he offers a participation rate of local advertising expenditures less 
than      
 
         
                    . (b) The highest profit of the manufacturer is 
gained when the two competitive retailers work together and play Stackelberg-Collusion 
game. However, under this coalition between the retailers, the manufacturer reduces his 
participation rate in retailers’ local advertising expenditures and keeps the same amount of 
national advertising spending. (c) The total profit of the supply chain is the highest under the 
cooperation game, while the lowest is under the Stackelberg - Cournot game. 
This paper has several directions deserving future research.  First, we suppose here that the 
manufacturer plays Stackelberg leader, but there are practical applications of retailers as 
Stackelberg leaders. We believe that is an interesting topic for future research if the retailers 
act as the Stackelberg leaders of the channel. Second, adopting a different form of the sales 
volume function may yield some more exciting results and could change the conclusions of 
our paper. 
Appendix  
The expressions of the sales volume and the profit of each member and the total channel’s 
profit for case  : 
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